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EMINENT DOMAIN
legitimately have been possible in the previous divorce action, had a dif-
ferent statute24 been invoked or had the court felt obliged to consider
the problem in the light of fairness and due process and opportunity to be
heard. The state's interests lie largely on the side of prompt and effective
safeguarding of the children's welfare,5 which seems sufficiently related
to the marriage relationship to justify treatment along with its adjudi-
cation, once the court has affirmatively determined the contacts and reason-
ableness issues. Such an approach would certainly then satisfy the state's
interest in assuring the integrity of its domestic institutions, while pro-
viding for the cleanup of those litigious problems often arising out of
marital estrangement.
The policy and trend in the law of jurisdiction has favored the ex-
pansion of the concept of personal jurisdiction to the limits of fairness
and reason. It is to be hoped that the dictum in Fleek does not indicate
an intransigent attitude, which, by "labelling the action with the question-
begging phrase 'in personam,' ,7 will always deny a forum to plaintiff-
spouses whose husbands are, for whatever reason, absent from the state.
ROBERT L. EPTING
Eminent Domain-An Expansion of the Definition of Taldng
While it has been axiomatic since 1897 that state and municipal gov-
ernments are bound by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to justly compensate for property taken for public use,1 the concep-
tual problems involved in defining "taking" and "public use" have created
uncertainty2 and, in some cases, caused injustice.8 It is clear that the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-98.2(6) (Supp. 1967) (departed debtor).
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948). See also State v. Bell, 184 N.C.
701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922) (divorce can neither terminate a father's relationship to
his children nor his continuing obligation to support them). North Carolina stat-
utory law also reflects the state's interest in the issue of child support. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325 (1953) (making nonsupport criminal); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 52A-6 (1953) (making nonsupport an extradictable offense).
JAMES § 12.8, at 642-43.
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 423 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
' Chicago, B. & O.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
'See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37-42 (1964),
tracing the conflicting views of Justices Harlan and Holmes on the question of
what constitutes a "taking" and introducing the original conflict between the doc-
trinal and functional or utilitarian approaches to "taking." See also 1 J. LEwis,
EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1900). The author states: "[When we come to seek
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public policy demanding flexibility in land use precludes any purely for-
malistic definition of "public use."'4 Thus, the term has outgrown the
early restrictive requirement that the property sought be destined for
actual "public employment." Rather, it has acquired an updated, policy-
oriented "public benefit" aspect.' Although there has been an ever-broad-
ening and socially responsive definition of "public use," the concomitant
has not been true of the concept of "taking."'  Certainly "taking" has
changed from the antiquated view that government must assert an actual
proprietary interest in the property before an owner may demand com-
pensation.' The modern view is that any substantial interference with
private property that destroys or significantly lessens its value is a "tak-
ing," even though title in the owner remains undisturbed.8 But this
seemingly broad definition has tended to be restricted and, on occasion,
has failed to protect adequately private property from some of the aber-
rations of increased eminent domain power.' However, there have been
several recent decisions that indicate that a new and broader definition
of "taking" may be developing to aid the property owner.' In the most
recent of these cases, Sayre v. United States," the court approached
"taking" with what appeared to be a doctrinal definition,12 but which,
upon closer scrutiny, proved utilitarian in application.
for the principles upon which the question of public use is to be determined, or
to define the words, 'public use,' in the light of judicial decisions, we find ourselves
utterly at sea." Id. at 410.
8 For a survey of the reasons which most courts give for making the owner
of property absorb the depreciation in the value of his land created by a taking of
adjacent land, see 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441 [1] (3d rev. ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
'See Morris, The Quiet Legal Revolution: Eminent Domain and Urban Re-
development, 52 A.B.A.J. 355, 356 (1966).
'Id.; Comment, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by
Eminent Domain, 1964 DUKE L.J. 123, 125; Note, Real Property-Eminent Do-
main -The Public Use Requirement, 46 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1968).
'See 26 Am. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 158 (1966) (concluding that the mean-
ing of "taking" is of decreasing importance).
'See Sax, supra note 2, at 37-42.8Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 567 (Ct. Cl. 1965); 2 NICHOILS
§ 6.3.
' See Dolle, Impending Condemnation and Stultification of Use, 3 REAL PROP.,
PRo. & TRUST J. 106 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Dolle].
" Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967) ; Foster v. City
of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); City of Cleveland v. Carcione,
116 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
11282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
'" The term "doctrinal" is used to indicate an approach to the law wherein
concepts are created into which facts must fit to enable the rule of law to apply.
This provides certainty, but it does not provide well for change in circumstances
nor does it facilitate policy decisions. Conversely, "utilitarian" is used to indi-
cate a functional approach that is dynamic but provides little certainty.
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Sayre involved the use of eminent domain power in urban redevelop-
ment, an area of governmental power that has been substantially aug-
mented by the expansion of the "public use" doctrine.13 Pursuant to the
Housing Act of 1949,'1 the Cleveland, Ohio, City Planning Commission
sought in January, 1961, to obtain federal funds under a grant and loan
contract by adopting an urban renewal plan.'5 After approval of the plan,
the defendant City of Cleveland initiated the University-Euclid Urban
Renewal Project I by sending notices to the residents and owners of the
affected area of its intent to acquire their property.' 6 Subsequently, the
city made "prominent and frequent public announcements and publication
through all local media of public communication of its intention to appro-
priate the properties."' 7 Yet the city, thereafter, acquired only a small
amount of the properties. At the same time, by following normal eminent
domain procedure 8 and denying any compensation for repairs to prop-
erty, the city effectively denied area owners, one of whom was the plain-
tiff's bankrupt, Liberty Mortgage Company, the right to repair their
swiftly deteriorating realty.'9 On November 2, 1964, the Liberty Mort-
gage Company was declared bankrupt.20 At that time the City of Cleve-
land had acquired not more than twelve of the scores of the company's
properties within the project area.21
On these stipulated facts, the federal district court held as a matter
of law that the city had abused its eminent domain power to an extent
that amounted to a pro tanto "taking."'2 In apparent ratification of the
doctrinal method, the court marshalled facts from the complaint which
fulfilled the required elements of conceptual taking-governmental inten-
tion to appropriate and governmental action amounting to appropria-
tion.3 However, the paucity of facts upon which the court relied, coupled
's Morris, supra note 4, at 355-56.
"42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
', 282 F. Supp. at 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1964), requiring the local
government to approve an urban renewal plan for an area before any funds are
made available.
" 282 F. Supp. at 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964), providing that "no
land for any project to be assisted under this subchapter shall be acquired by the
local public agency except after public hearing following notice of the date, time,
place and purpose of such hearing."
'282 F. Supp. at 179. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(e) (1964).
See Dolle.
"282 F. Supp. at 179.
0I"d.
21LId.
2 Id. at 192.
23 Id. at 184, 185.
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with the court's slight deviation from precise conceptualism, reveals the
actual utilitarian approach of the opinion.
Quoting from Biggs Realty Co. v. United States,24 the court in Sayre
stated that " '[t]o constitute a taking there must be an intent on the part
of the [defendant] to take plaintiff's properties, or at least an intention
to do an act the natural consequences of which was to take property.' ,,26
In Foster v. City of Detroit,26 upon which Sayre most heavily relied,
finding intent had been easy, since that fact was established by the com-
pletion of the appropriation proceedings.17 Thus, the court in Foster
merely had to decide at what point in time the taking had occurred. How-
ever, in Sayre the eminent domain proceedings, though commenced in
accordance with law, had never been concludedI and this complicated
the question of intent.' The court held that publication of notices to the
effect that the city intended, at some future time, to procure plaintiff's
properties was sufficient to establish an intention to do an act the natural
consequences of which was to take property. 0 This then was the first
crack in the doctrinal wall surrounding the concept of "taking." The
"natural consequences" test for intent introduced an element of reason-
able expectation into the concept of "taking," and like most tests of reason-
ableness, it allowed for balancing policy considerations. Could not the
City of Cleveland reasonably expect that publication of the notices, fol-
lowed by city inaction, would result in the gradual abandonment by ten-
ants of the Liberty Mortgage Company's properties within the project
area and subsequent vandalism of the vacated properties? The outcome
in Sayre hinged upon the answer to that question. However, to analyze
the concept of "taking," it is the formulation of that question that is
crucial.
Even with the intent to appropriate established, the court in Sayre
had to find some act by the city sufficient to implement that intent. Again
the court relied upon the reasoning in Foster3 and concluded that Cleve-
land, by initiating steps to appropriate the bankrupt's properties without
the proper planning for completing the appropriation, had abused its
24353 F.2d 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
25282 F. Supp. at 185.
28 Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
282 F. Supp. at 185. See Committee on New Developments in Real Estate
Practice, Inverse Condemnation, 3 REAL PaOP., PROB. & TRUST J. 173, 175 (1968).8 282 F. Supp. at 185.
"2 See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 27, at 176.
" 282 F. Supp. at 185.
" Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
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power. 2 However, the court stated that abuse of power alone was not
enough to constitute an act of taking, where there had been no formal
condemnation proceedings, unless that act of abuse "directly and prox-
imately contributes to, hastens, and aggravates, acting alone or in com-
bination with other causes, the deterioration and decline in value of the
area and the subject property."33 The court required this element of
causation to fulfill the concept of "taking."
The court rendered its decision that the required concepts of intention
and action were fulfilled by the facts pleaded and that they constituted a
taking for which there had to be just compensation. But what were the
crucial facts? The City of Cleveland published the notices of intent to
acquire and then did nothing, and as a result there occurred the rapid
depreciation of bankrupt's properties. Upon these same crucial facts, the
law prior to Sayre was well settled that "land is not damaged or taken
in a constitutional sense by reason of preliminary proceedings looking
to its appropriation for a public use." 4 Furthermore, one district court,35
in a widely quoted opinion,36 had expressly rejected the proposition that
the institution of condemnation proceedings could lead to such an inter-
ference with private property rights as to constitute a taking:
The reasoning seems to be that the very filing of this suit interferes
with the normal freedom of an owner to use and dispose of his prop-
erty. But such interference is inherent in all condemnation proceedings.
No case has been cited or found which supports the view that the con-
demnation action itself constitutes a taking. The court finds no merit
in it.37
The court in Sayre, under the guise of conceptualism, has clearly promul-
gated a definition of "taking" that creates new law at least with reference
to the conduct of eminent domain proceedings in urban redevelopment
situations. This law stands as a warning to local governments that they
must not abuse their power of eminent domain in substance or procedure,
so as to injuriously affect private property.
The utilitarian effect of this expanded definition of taking is twofold.
First, it will help correct the major fault current in the eminent domain
" 282 F. Supp. at 192.
Id. at 185.
"26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 168 (1966). See also 2 NICHOLS § 6.13
[3]; Dolle 107.
" Government of the Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp.
495 (D.V.I. 1960).
"See, e.g., 2 NICHOLS § 6.13 [3] n.9; Dolle 107.
185 F. Supp. at 498.
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power-procedural inadequacy. 8 Second, it will prevent what has been
called "stultifying the use of property"39 and thereby protect private prop-
erty rights more fully.
The inadequacies current in eminent domain procedures seem to be
a by-product of the expanded "public use" doctrine. That doctrine has
increased local government's power over land use while, simultaneously,
federal funds have become increasingly available under the Housing Act of
1949. These developments have created an atmosphere that encourages in-
creased use of eminent domain power, thereby effectuating society's need
for land development. 40 Although these tendencies have resulted in a great-
er volume of public land acquisition, the methods for handling this increase
have been left largely to the ingenuity of the local governments, except for
those general guidelines upon which the federal grants are conditioned. 41
The strain on local procedures is most obvious in cases like Sayre and
Foster, where property remains subject to condemnation for long periods
of time.42 Hence the mandate of the court in Sayre seems designed to
make local governments either increase the number of personnel handling
their existing condemnation procedures to accommodate this increased
volume or renovate these procedures so that each acquisition might be
more efficiently accomplished. To implement this mandate, the court
establishes a definition of "taking" that will permit each property owner
to redress procedural abuse to his property by demanding compensation
for unreasonable delay in appropriation that results in demonstrable loss.
The stultification of land caused by impending condemnation usually
manifests itself in two forms.4" Either the owner is unable to sell his
property because of public knowledge that it may be condemned, or he is
effectively prevented from developing it by governmental denial of com-
pensation for repairs. Thus, fundamental rights to control property are
divested by the initiation of eminent domain proceedings. And the longer
those proceedings take, the greater is the owner's deprivation. Conse-
quently, the holding in Sayre, by demanding more expeditious condem-
nation procedures, also protects the owner's right to use his property as
he wishes.
Perhaps the expansion of the concept of "taking" in Sayre can best
be attributed to an abstract need to strike a balance between the public
, See Comment, Urban Renewal, supra note 5, at 124.
Dolle 106.Comment, Urban Renewal, supra note 5. See Morris, supra note 4.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (1964).
42282 F. Supp. at 178-79 (four years) ; 254 F. Supp. at 660 (thirteen years).
Dolle 106.
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good and the individual's right to be free from injury. As the ex-
pansion of the "public use" doctrine has greatly augmented govern-
ment's power to implement the former, Sayre seems to be a reaction to
this power increase, thereby protecting the latter. However, by protecting
the individual's rights, Sayre has not impaired the public's interest, for
the streamlining of eminent domain procedures assures a quicker imple-
mentation of that interest while avoiding any accelerated deterioration
of the property that is the subject of that interest.
KENNETH B. Hipp
Federal Jurisdiction-The Delimitation of Erie
and a Redefinition of "Laws"
In Ivey Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph,1 plain-
tiff brought an action in federal court to recover damages for negligence
and breach of contract in the rendition of interstate telephone service.
Diversity of citizenship not being present, both the complaint and a
counterclaim for charges due for the same services were dismissed. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that federal
common law was applicable and that the district court had original
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2
Reversing the normal order of analysis,' the court first held that fed-
eral law was controlling. It found that the field of interstate communica-
tions had been preEmpted by the federal government, especially where
the outcome of the case might adversely affect the federal policy of uni-
formity of rates.4 The court held that a congressional policy of uni-
formity of services could be implied from the congressional policy of
uniformity of rates embodied in the Interstate Communications Act of
1 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 234 F. Supp. 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
'28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where-
in the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
'Usually the courts treat the jurisdictional question first because there is a
presumption that the court lacks jurisdiction until it is shown that it has juris-
diction over the subject matter. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 14 (1963).
'See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Good-
win Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919).
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